The question how different electoral systems affect the representation of voters in parliaments has been a thorny issue for a considerable time. While some research suggests that first-past-the-posts systems should lead to a closer correspondence between the preferences of the electoral district's median voter and of its representative, other work concludes that in proportional representation (PR) systems, especially with open lists, candidates have an incentive to cultivate a strong personal vote.
Introduction ?
A consensus seems to exist in the literature that electoral systems affect the way in which interests are represented in parliaments. More precisely, the rules under which members of parliament (MPs) are elected influence the attention they pay either to broad-based constituency preferences or more narrow-based special interests (e.g., ?; ?). Where the literature disagrees, however, is regarding the exact relationship between electoral systems (i.e., majoritarian and proportional representation) and the type of representation. In a series of recent articles (e.g. ?; ?; ?; ?; ?; ?; ?; ?; ?; ? ) a debate has emerged on how congruence between citizens and their representatives (MPs, parties, and governments) should be measured and whether and how this congruence depends on the electoral system.
At the theoretical level and focusing on the electoral connection 1 scholars disagree whether majoritarian systems lead to more centripetal competition (to use the term employed by ?), or whether proportional representation favors more moderate candidates. At the empirical level studies of this relationship are hampered by the well known ? (at least since the work by ?, 1978) difficulties in measuring representation. ? alerted the discipline that finding correlations between voter and MP positions in no way allows us to judge how well voters are represented by elected officials. His proposed solutions require, however, measures on the same scale, something largely amiss in most empirical studies. 2
In the present paper we first review the various strands of research dealing with the relationship of voter and MP preferences. Concurring with ? we emphasize that in studies on congruence the exact type of relationship to be studied needs to be clearly defined. As ? argue the first and important relationship in this context is the relationship between voters and MPs. 3 From this (largely) theoretical literature we derive a simple hypothesis that we will assess with a novel dataset.
This dataset combines the full voting record of MPs in the Swiss lower house of parliament from three legislative periods with the voting results in referendum campaigns. Given that both MPs and citizens voted on a series of identical issues (with exactly the same question for them to consider) we can use these referendum votes to link the voter preferences to MP preferences. This allows us to circumvent the pernicious problem in the study of representation, namely the lack of common scales (e.g., ?; ?). We discuss in section three the methods we use by drawing on work linking voting behavior in different institutional settings by ? ?(see also ?; ?) and as employed by ? to link constituency preferences with those of MPs. While this dataset allows us to estimate simultaneously ideological positions of voters (more precisely the median voter) and their elected MPs, the Swiss context offers an additional advantage for the theoretical question we are interested in. A small proportion of the MPs of the lower house are elected in majoritarian elections, while the rest are elected through proportional representation. Section four reports our main empirical results which demonstrate that in majoritarian electoral systems the MPs are located on average more closely to the median voter's positions than in proportional representation systems. Hence, proportional representation systems lead to MPs being much more spread out in ideological terms than majoritarian systems. Section five concludes.
Electoral systems, incentives and representation
First theoretical insights on how electoral systems relate to the positions of candidates and MPs appeared in models of spatial competition. Early work by ? and ? demonstrated that if voters vote for the closest (in policy and/or spatial terms) candidate in a majoritarian election with only two candidates the latter should position themselves at the location of the median voter (provided such a median exists) (for a review see ? Obviously all these spatial models assume that political parties, especially in proportional representation elections, take ideological positions and thus act as unitary actors. In most parliamentary systems this is assumed to hold due to the considerable party discipline. Candidates and future MPs, however, have obviously also incentives to appeal to specific groups of voters, possibly independently of their political party (see for instance the work on the German parliament by ?; ?, discussed below). Work by ? and ? deals exactly with this question. In their more general analysis ? find that MPs elected under closed-list proportional representation respond more heavily to special interest groups than those elected in majoritarian systems. Vice-versa the former respond less to more broad-based voter interests. ? careful analysis highlights the complex interplay of different features of electoral systems which leads them to a very prudent assessment of the latter's combined effects.
Much less prudence transpires in ? analysis of electoral systems in terms of the incentives the latter create for MPs to cultivate a personal vote (see also ?).
They consider that three elements affect these incentives, namely whether there is a fixed ballot, whether votes are pooled across a party and whether voters cast a vote for a party or not. ? consider the relationships between voter preferences and both party positions and government positions and come to the conclusion that in proportional representation systems parties are more dispersed around the voters' preferences, but coalition formation leads to similarly centrist government positions as in majoritarian systems. ?, based on a select number of cases, finds strong evidence that parties are more dispersed in proportional representation than in plurality systems, while ?, based on a more comprehensive set of cases and a different methodology, finds no such effect. In a more recent study covering more countries and elections ? finds again the expected effect, namely less dispersion of parties in plurality systems. ? concedes to this new empirical result, contests, however, the assumed causal mechanism, namely vote seeking. 9 Relatedly, and based on a more careful conceptualization of congruence, ?
find no significant difference in terms of congruence between proportional rep-7 The theoretical underpinning for this rank ordering is rather weak, and as ? themselves admit, whether the ranks between plurality and PR systems can be compared is doubtful.
8 Related to this work are the studies by ?, who present some empirical results on the provision of public goods, which rely in part on similar arguments dealing with the incentives that different electoral systems create for MPs (?) . See also ? and ? for an argument about the effect of electoral systems on corruption.
9 His empirical strategy based on trying to explain vote shares as a function of closeness to the median voter suffers, however, from a rather severe interdependence of the cases stemming from the same election. resentation and plurality systems. ? argues and presents empirical evidence, however, that the period studied by ? (and ?, for that matter) is special, as in most previous periods the congruence between voter preferences and government positions is smaller in majoritarian systems than in proportional representation systems. 10
More fine-grained analyses are presented by ? who finds that in the German Bundestag voting against party lines in roll call votes is more frequent among members with a direct mandate (i.e., elected according to a plurality rule) than among those elected on party lists (i.e., elected according to PR). Similarly, the former MPs are also more likely to be in committees that may allocate directly funds to their electoral districts. 11 Similarly, ? presents in a recent comparative study that MPs with stronger local roots in their electoral district are more likely to defect from the party line in parliamentary voting. Interestingly enough, the author only finds mixed and somewhat counterintuitive results for the effect of district magnitude on defection from the party line (?, 806) .
Based on these various theoretical considerations and the recent empirical studies we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: In proportional representation systems the MPs are more widely dispersed around the median voter, while in majoritarian systems MPs cluster more closely around the median voter.
This hypothesis is clearly implied under ? analysis and under certain conditions by ? work. 12 To note here is the fact that we will test this hypothesis on the basis of ideological positions of MPs and their median voters. Some of the theoretical work discussed above is, however, more geared toward explaining the position of candidates. Needless to say, in equilibrium, many of the candidate configurations should translate more or less directly into the configurations of MPs. 13 10 ? explores an issue more tangential to the present topic, namely whether ?, "median mandate theory" is an artefact of the empirical strategy.
11 ? also study the incentives for pork barrel as a function of electoral systems. Relatedly ? find that candidates running in German single member districts employ different campaign styles than candidates running on party lists in multi-member districts.
12 ? rank ordering, given its rather weak theoretical underpinning and the problem admitted by the authors that plurality and PR elections might operate differently, we refrain from using it.
13 Though see ? finding that elected MPs, generally Republican incumbents, are less "representative" of voter preferences in the dataset he analyzes.
Data and methods
As discussed above a major challenge for studies trying to assess how electoral systems affect representation is the well-known problem of assessing representation highlighted by ? 14 and discussed in this specific context by ?. 15 More precisely, accurate tests of the propositions discussed above require information on opinions and policy positions on the exact same scales both for MPs or parties and their voters. Such data is, however, almost never available. Even in situations where both party members, MPs and voters responded to questions on policy positions worded exactly in the same way, we cannot be sure that the various interviewees responded to the same stimulus (see for instance ?). Similarly, even if the same observational data is used to estimate voter and party preferences as discussed by ? for the party manifesto studies, this hardly yields the necessary data to establish validly the hypothesized differences. 16 Table ? ? lists the number of MPs by canton. The legislators of the lower house are elected by proportional representation, but as there are small cantons with only one legislator, the latter are elected in majoritarian elections (?) . 18 This constitutes a first advantage for the present study.
Data
14 We employ the notion of representation as discussed by ?, and thus in a sense that makes it practically identical to the notion of congruence as used in the more recent literature 15 See also the critique presented by ? and the response by ?, as well as the well argued empirical critique of ?. 16 Interesting to note is that ? finds quite considerable correlations between the various measurement strategies he discusses. It might well be, however, that all of them yield equally biased information (see also ?; ?).
17 Ideally, we would also like to cover the upper house, where all members except two are elected in majoritarian elections. Unfortunately, the upper house does not use an electronic voting system, and as a consequence only very little information on the voting record of these MPs is available (see ?; ?).
18 In addition the way citizens cast votes (i.e., an open list system) should make finding empirical support for hypothesis 1 even more challenging according to some authors (see for Table ? ? about here A second advantage is that since 1996 the lower house of the Swiss parliament employs an electronic voting system recording all votes by MPs. Hence, a complete voting record is available, circumventing problems of selection bias if only requested (or selected) roll call votes are available (see for instance ?). 19 For the MPs we have for the three legislative periods (45 th − 47 th ) information on 2790, respectively 3227 and 3765 votes. 20 Among each of those roughly 3000 votes for each legislative period we find 32, respectively 40, and 19 votes where the voters were confronted with exactly the same question at the ballot box. 21
Methods
Having at hand behavioral data which allows direct comparisons between MPs and voters the question is how we may analyze them to compare policy positions of these two sets of actors. Recent work on ideal-point estimation (for an excellent survey see ?) has shown different possibilities how policy positions may be estimated across different institutional contexts which are directly comparable. ? ?(see also ?; ?) have used roll call votes and decision information to provide estimates of policy positions of congressmen, judges and presidents. The main idea behind these models is that as long as either two sets of actors have voted on the same proposal in different institutions, or the same actor has belonged instance ?). 19 Early studies using parts of this data appear in ?, ?, and ?. 20 This corresponds to the full voting record, except in situations where the electronic voting system malfunctioned (rarely) and the first few sessions of the 45 th legislative period. For the analyses presented in the main text we only employ final passage votes, given that these might exclude strategic voting (though see ?) and the convergence of the MCMC chains was smoother. As we report in the appendix, the main results are, however, not affected by this limitation.We provide more detail on the data in the appendix. 21 In part there are few votes in the last period, since between a vote in parliament and a popular vote up to a couple of years may pass. Again, in the appendix we provide more detail on these bridging observations. In addition, as described in detail in the appendix we faced in the 45 th and 46 th the situation that for some popular initiatives parliament chose to submit a counter proposal. In that situation the final passage vote in parliament pits the initiative against the counter proposal, while in the popular vote, each of these projects is voted upon separately. In the analyses presented below we retained the MPs' vote as is and combined it with a variable for the cantons indicating whether they accepted the counter proposal or the initiative. Our results barely change if we use any of the other three codings discussed in the appendix. Concerning another coding decision our results would be strengthened if we included also parliamentary votes from the beginning of the 45 th legislature, but which were held under different rules. To provide conservative estimates, we refrain from presenting these stronger results.
to different institutions at different times, we may use these observations (votes on the same proposal, respectively votes by the same person) to bridge our estimations across different institutions and thus make the estimates of positions of difference sets of actors (in our case MPs and their median voters) directly comparable (for an application to the Swiss upper and lower houses see ?).
? apply this exact same technique to votes by citizens and MPs in California, taking advantage of the numerous votes by California's citizens. 22 We employ exactly the same approach and combine for each legislative period the MPs'
votes with the voting results in the electoral districts, namely whether a majority voted in favor or against a proposal. This obviously corresponds to the decisions of the median voter. Following ? (see also ?; ?) we use a one-dimensional item-response theory model to estimate left-right positions of both MPs and the median voters. 23
Empirics
Our estimations provide ideal-point estimates both for the MPs during the three legislative periods and the median voters of the 26 electoral districts. Figure  ? ? provides graphical illustrations of these estimates, where the horizontal axis reflects the ideological ideal-point from left to right. In the middle at the bottom of each panel we find the estimated ideal points of the median voters of the 26 cantons (i.e., electoral districts. Not surprisingly these median voters are all quite centrally located compared to the remaining estimates, namely those of the MPs' ideal points. There we find more variance and as the credible intervals depicted suggest, also some uncertainty related to the estimates. Figure ? ? about here
The differences between the MPs' positions and those of his or her median voter's position should, according to our hypothesis presented above, be related to the electoral system. For simplicity we present our tests of hypothesis 1 graphically as boxplots and provide non-parametric ?-? tests based on a comparison of 22 Their analyses are hampered, however, by the fact that the heavy use of initiatives and the latter's direct nature severely reduces the number of bridging observations. 23 Refraining from estimating a second dimension is justified by ? analysis of the roll call data of the Swiss MPs, demonstrating the importance and predominance of the first dimension. These authors also demonstrate that the first dimension corresponds quite accurately to a left-right continuum (see also ?).
the distributions in the two electoral systems. 24 Our main dependent variable is the absolute deviation of an MP's position from the median voter of her district, which we call deviance.
The three panels in figure ? ? depict the boxplots of the absolute deviance for all MPs present in one of the three legislatures we consider. In all three legislatures the median of the absolute deviance (represented by the solid horizontal lines in figure ??) is lower in plurality districts than in proportional representation districts. Only in the 45 th and in the 47 th legislature is the distribution significantly different (at least according to the "interocular traumatic test" (Joe Berkson cited in ?, 217)). 25 Figure ? ? about here
While figure ? ? already provides some support for our hypothesis 1, it is obviously based on what ? call the "absolute citizen congruence." While such a measure may make sense in some contexts, in most, as ? and ? implicitly argue, this absolute deviance has to be put in relation to the voters' dispersion.
To measure dispersion we rely on survey data that gives us the mean responses Table ? ? reports these results and also indicates the number of respondents per electoral district.
This already provides some information on the positions of the voters and 24 In the appendix we report various parametric tests that support the conclusions presented here. 25 The differences between the two distributions in these two legislatures are also statistically significant as the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whintey test and p values in parentheses suggest: 45 th 279 (0.067), 46 th 583 (0.816) and 47 th 261 (0.012).
26 While using this survey has the disadvantage that it has been carried out after the observations of the votes by MPs and citizens, it is the only one that has sufficiently large sets of respondents from each electoral district, i.e. canton. In a previous version of this paper we have employed the data of the Swiss household panel which has also sizeable, though smaller, sets of respondents in each canton. Similarly, we have also used the data from the 1995, 1999 and 2003 waves of the Swiss election studies. We found largely similar results but have more confidence in the results presented below and assume that the dispersion of the voters in each canton was largely constant between 1995 and 2007. 27 The observations from the Swiss election study were weighted as suggested.
how dispersed they are in and across electoral districts. While these results provide quite strong evidence in support of our hypothesis, namely that in plurality elections MPs cluster more closely around the median voter, sceptics might argue that the effect of the electoral system might be largely driven by the district magnitude. To address this issue we depict in ?? similar boxplots as in figure ? ?, but do so for each district magnitude to be found in the three elections. Figure ? ? about here As figure ? ? clearly illustrates, there is no clear pattern that relates increases in district magnitude with increased levels of absolute deviance. We find, however, again a quite considerable increase in deviance when moving from districts 28 One might argue that our empirical strategy might be hampered also by differences in voting results in referendums across electoral districts. To assess this we depict in the appendix (figure ??) the average values of the Herfindahl-Index of the referendum results as a function of the district magnitude. While single member districts appear to vote more homogenously, there are other districts with higher magnitude that vote almost (or even more) homogenously.
29 The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and p values in parentheses are the following 45 th 332 (0.145), 46 th 650 (0.832) and 47 th 283 (0.018) with one seat to those with more in the 45th and 47th legislature. In the remaining legislature, the pattern is much more unclear.
Our analyses clearly demonstrate that proportional representation systems create incentives for MPs to diverge more strongly from the median voter's position than in majoritarian systems. 30 This is clear support for our hypothesis, mostly inspired from ? theoretical work and implicitly relying on ? theoretical models. We also tested ? more specific implication, but found only scant support for it. This is due to the fact that for very few elections we would have predicted dispersion. 31 This is largely because the number of candidates and party lists present in Swiss elections is much higher than what ? theoretical models would predict. Hence, with such high values for m, the equilibrium conditions analyzed by ? would almost always predict dispersion.
Conclusion
That electoral systems affect MPs is probably a truism. The literature diverges, however, when it comes to specify at the theoretical level how electoral systems affect the ideological positions of MPs. The theoretically soundest implications suggest that in proportional representation systems MPs and candidates have an incentive to diverge from the median voter of their district and to spreadout over the ideological space. In majoritarian systems, however, except under specific circumstances as highlighted by ?, convergence toward the median voter is expected.
While these theoretical insights are well-established, empirical tests are hampered by the fact that appropriate measures for the ideological positions of MPs and their (median) voters on identical scales are often impossible to come by. We took advantage in the present study of the fact that Swiss voters vote on a sizeable number of topics with identical questions as those that MPs have voted upon. Using these votes as bridging observations allowed us to estimate in a common ideological space the position of the MPs in three legislatures and the positions 30 In additional parametric tests we also controlled for the magnitude of the electoral districts whose effect was, however, systematically dwarfed by the difference between proportional representation and plurality systems. Similarly, we assessed whether the median position per party in the various districts follows similar patterns and found largely identical results. 31 More precisely, using his formulas discussed above we find only 2 (45 th ), respectively 1 (46 th ) and 0 (47 th ) electoral districts for which central clustering would be expected. of their median voters. Using these estimates we were able to demonstrate that MPs elected by proportional representation are on average farther away from their median voters than their colleagues elected in majoritarian systems. This effect remained even when we controlled for the ideological dispersion of voters (estimated from a separate source) which might be related to the electoral system used.
On the other hand we were not able to find support for ? more precise implications, linking dispersion or its absence not only to the electoral system but also to the number of votes, the number of seats to be gained and the number of competitors. It is exactly the latter element which in the Swiss context causes problems. Table ? ? presents the regression underlying the analysis displayed in figure ? ?. The coefficient of the proportional representation is always positive but not significant in the 46 th legislature. The results concerning ? dispersion are disappointing due to the distribution of the dummy as discussed above. Finally, and as expected, the dispersion of the voters has a positive impact on the absolute deviation. A more controversial concern is the use of voters' dispersion as control variable. Indeed, as highlighted by ?, ? and ?, if we are interested in comparing congruence across different kinds of political units, it is often not sufficient to use a measure of absolute congruence and control for the dispersion of voters. Table ? ? displays regressions, the dependent variable of which being the absolute deviance standardized by the dispersion of voters. The models still show similar trends as those presented and discussed in the main text.
The deviance in the models presented so far have been estimated from roll calls containing only final votes. Indeed, because non final votes could reflect strategic voting instead of frank attitudes (see for instance ?), we preferred to base our estimations on final votes only (though see ?). Other advantages are that final votes have a lower rate of missing values, and that the Markov Chains we obtained bear more resemblance to only noise plus a constant. However if strategic votes are part of the game, one can also argue that those votes should be taken into account. Tables ?? and ?? present outcomes obtained from estimations based on all votes, 34 respectively with non-standardized and standardized measures of deviance. Again, the results are rather similar. Table ? ? about here Table ? ? about here
Appendix B
The method used for positioning the voters (see ?; ?), and thus the MPs and cantons on a left-right scale has been implemented in R by ?. This method (CJR) allows estimating, from a matrix of p votes [v ij ] (n×p) , the positions of n voters on the main dimension of the policy space as characterized by the votes.
CJR is based on a utility function defined by the Item Response Theory (IRT). In the IRT, the policy space is assumed to be Euclidian and the utilities are squared distances. Concretely, in our case, the voters and the two possible outcome of each vote can be located in this space. An example in a one dimensional Euclidian space, here the left-right scale, can be presented as follow:
With θ i the ideological position of the i th voter, and Y j and N j , respectively the YES and NO locations of the j th vote.The utility of a voter i to accept (reject) a vote j is minus the squared distance between his position and the location of the output YES (NO) of the vote j plus un error term:
• the covariance matrices of the errors (the η ij and τ ij ) are diagonal,
• ij := (η ij − τ ij )/σ j and σ j := V (η ij − τ ij ), with the covariance matrix of the ij being the identity matrix. Now if we assume that each voter acts in order to maximize his utility and has a constant ideal position, we can deduce that there is a higher probability that the voter i will accept the vote than reject it, his utility to accept the vote being higher than his utility to reject the vote. Concretely, we can state the following probability distribution for the vote j of a voter i:
Using the above utility function, we have:
under the assumption that the ij are normally distributed and with α j = −(N j · N j )/σ j + (Y j · Y j )/σ j and β j = (2 · (Y j − N j ))/σ j , another way to contain information of the Yes and No locations. Thus the likelihood function that links the observed variables V (i.e., the votes) to the θ's is:
with β the vector [β j ] of length p, α the vector [α j ] of length p and θ the vector [θ i ] of length n. Because v ij are dichotomous variables, the function has the form of a Binomial. As we see, parameters β and α also have to be estimated. Therefore, β , α and θ are estimated iteratively using Gibbs sampling algorithm.
That is values for β, α and θ are drawn iteratively, conditionally with respect to the other values. Or, in other words, the values are drawn from iteratively estimated posterior distributions. Such chain simulations results in a sequence of random vectors. This sequence is a Markov chain Monte Carlo. The properties of Markov Chains allow one to prove that our sequence is stationary and that it converges to the target parameters β, α and θ. The values of each series gives rise to the final estimated posterior distributions. 35 . Thus we obtain from those distributions estimates of β, α and our parameter of interest, θ. Table ? ? lists the number of parameters of the model we used for estimating the left-right positions. Figures ??, ?? and ?? gives an idea of the type of estimated posterior distribution we obtain, using only final votes. In each Figure, the two first chains are the ones whose the convergence are the less convincing. The third presents a typical chain of a MP and the fourth a typical chain of a Canton. The first chain presented in Figure ? ? is the one of an MP who stayed only a half year in the National Council during the 45 th legislature (the normal mandate of an MP is four years). Thus the MP has a high number of missing values, which is the reason why the variance of the distribution is high. The second chain corresponds to an MP who stayed only two years in parliament; the variance is lower. Concerning the MPs, a majority has the same type of distribution as the one presented by the third chain and density. The variance of the series is low. The fourth chain is the typical chain obtained for each of the Cantons. Figure ?? gives examples of distributions obtained for the 46 th legislature. The first chain is the one of a MP who stayed a half year in the National Council, the second nine months and the third the whole legislature (as it is the case for almost all legislators) and the last is a Canton. Here also we see that the variance is lower for the MPs who stayed the whole legislature. The first chain presented in Figure ? ? has a high variance. Indeed, this legislator was MP for less than three months. The second was an MP for one year and a half. The third shows the typical chain we have for the majority of legislators and the fourth, the typical chain we obtain for the cantons. Concerning the convergence, all of the chains seem to have converged early in the iterative process, except maybe the two first chain (and the very few others not represented here) presented in each of the three Figures.−4 3 left − right indexc Due to the fact that there was a tacit election, the datas come from the Swiss election studies 2003. Source: Marie-Christine Fontana, Peter Selb, Romain Lachat: Electoral Surveys in Switzerland -1971 . Production: SIDOS, Swiss information and data archive service for the social sciences, Neuchâtel. Distributed by SIDOS (weighted according to provided weights). 
